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Abstract
We analyze a search engine market from a law and economics perspective and
incorporate the choice of quality improving innovations by a search engine platform in a
two-sided model of internet search engine. In the proposed framework we, rst, discuss
the legal issues the search engine market raises for antitrust policy through analysis of
several types of abusive behavior by the dominant search engine. We also explore the
possible consequences of monopolization of the search engine market for advertisers
and users in the form of excessive pricing and deterioration of the quality of the search
results. Second, in the technical analysis part we incorporate these considerations in
a two-sided market model and analyze the rate of innovation, pricing, and quality
choices by the dominant search engine. Our ndings show that a dominant monopoly
platform results in higher prices and underinvestment in quality improving innovations
by a search engine relative to the social optimum. More generally, we show that
monopoly is sub-optimal both in terms of harm to advertisers in the form of excessive
prices, harm to users in the form of reduction in quality of search results, as well as
harm to the society in the form of lower innovation rates in the industry.
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1 Introduction
Even though the search engine market is relatively young, law and economics literature is
confronted with a number of important questions related to the rapid growth of online search,
its concentration, and its increasing importance for our society. In this paper we analyze
the implications of excessive concentration and market dominance in search engines market
for di¤erent players (such as users and advertisers) and di¤erent market outcomes (such as
prices charged to advertisers and the quality of search results). We analyze what issues the
search market raises for antitrust policy and whether the search market requires regulation
that would prevent it from monopolization by a single company (such as Google). The main
aim of this paper is to illustrate how advanced economic models of two-sided markets can
be employed to analyze possible legal antitrust issues arising in the search engine market.
The markets for search-based and online advertising have a number of specic features
that set them apart from most markets. These features include network e¤ects, double-
sidedness, and high levels of R&D and innovation. Network e¤ects often play an important
role in analyzing competition in R&D intensive markets. Network e¤ects present opportuni-
ties for enhanced consumer welfare, but also can create the potential for competitive harm
and increased barriers to entry. There are certainly some positive network e¤ects, in view
of the improvement of the algorithmic results, following the increase of end userssearches
and thus keywords. It is also possible to advance the existence of indirect network e¤ects,
as advertisers value more a search engine with a greater number of end users. Manne and
Wright (2011) challenge nevertheless the importance of network e¤ects: they note that net-
work e¤ects are unidirectionalas advertisers want more end users, but end users do not
care about the number of advertisers (or they care negatively having less advertisements is
more appreciated).1 On the contrary, Evans (2008) notes the existence of a positive feedback
loop between the search and the advertiser sides. In any case, the potential interplay be-
tween network e¤ects and innovation incentives in the search market must be examined (see
e.g. Economides (2010) or Larouche (2009)). In this project we utilize the existing models
of two-sided markets by e.g. Armstrong (2006) to analyze R&D e¤orts or investments into
quality improvements by a dominant platform in the presence of possible network e¤ects.
This allows us to analyze the interplay between innovation and pricing incentives in the
1Manne and Wright (2011) also question the link between the number of end users and the value accorded
by advertisers, observing that an increase in the number of users looking only for information and not aiming
to purchase a good or service may be of little value for advertisers. In any case, indirect network e¤ects, if
there are any, are already internalized by the price advertisers have to pay to the search engine, as they are
charged per e¤ective click to the advertiserslanding page. Thus, there are no external benets in the search
engine business and advertisers are in principle able to switch to another search engine without the need to
be compensated for lost external benets (Manne and Wright, 2011).
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search engine market and in two-sided markets in general.
Obviously, the structure of the search engine market and its pricing/quality strategies
have certain distinctive features. The search engine acts as a platform intermediating be-
tween content providers (who want users), users (who want content), and advertisers (who
want users). Closely related to this structure of connections between agents is the associated
pricing structure, where users/searchers enjoy the service for free2, advertisers are required
to pay strictly positive prices for search engine services (at least with regard to sponsored or
paid links)3, and content providers are subsidized by the search engine. These features of the
search engine markets call for applications of two-sided markets models as has already been
recognized in Devine (2008), Evans (2010), Jeon et al. (2011), or Halaburda and Yehezkel
(2011). While a positive price is only set for one of the three groups (i.e. advertisers), quality
competition plays nevertheless an important role with regard to the relation between search
engines and users and between search engines and content providers, by the intermediary of
users (the better a search engine is, the more users it will attract and thus the more valuable
it will be for content providers).
Furthermore, search engines are di¤erent from other web-sites because of their crucial
gateway role. The users of search engines are more valuable from the advertisers perspective
compared to the users of any other web-sites, since they provide important information
about themselves and their intentions through their search query. Search engines act as
information gatekeepers: they do not only provide information on what can be found on
the web (equivalent to yellow pages), but also they are an essential rst-point-of-call for
anyone venturing onto the Internet(see Pollock (2010)). To the di¤erence of other two sided
platforms, search engines detain an important amount of information about their customers
and advertisers (the map of commerce, Spulber (2009)). Utilizing this information allows
2Search engines are constrained to price at zero, as imposing negative or positive prices will produce
transaction costs.
3Organic or natural results are generated without involving any direct cost for the websites linked. For
example, the majority of Googles income comes from sponsored links paid by the featured organization, the
amount of Googles charges been calculated according to a Vickrey second price keyword auction, adjusted by
quality factorsand conducted through Googles AdWords platform. The quality scoreis a metric looking
at a variety of factors, such as the historical clickthrough rate, the users account history, the quality of the
landing page (determined by Google after analysis of the relevant and original content, transparency and ease
of navigation), the relevance of the keyword to the ads in its ad group, the relevance of the keyword and the
matched ad to the search query, the accounts performance in the geographical region where the ad will be
shown. Quality scoresmake it possible to di¤erentiate between advertisers: an advertiser with a low quality
score will have to pay more per click (high cost per click) to achieve higher search results positions than
advertisers with better quality scores, as a compensation for the opportunity cost for Google of not listing
higher more relevant advertisements and consequently the degradation of the quality of the search engine,
as it will produce less relevant results. The quality score formula is generally opaque, as making the ranking
formula accessible will make it easier for people to game the system. The rest of Googles income comes
from selling advertisements in designated spaces in third-party websites, through its AdSense application.
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search engines to increase the relevance of their advertisements, and increased relevance
means increased value to those who wish to advertise. Hence, the quality of matching and
the quality and the relevance of search results are valued not only by users of the search
engine, but also by advertisers. These arguments imply that the quality of the search and
the relevance of the search results play a crucial role for both consumers and advertisers.
In pursuit of quality improvement, search engines invest heavily in technology. Search
engines are R&D intensive and the market generally displays high levels of innovation. Ac-
cording to Devine (2008), the search engine industry operates in an innovative environment
where rms compete not only to outdo competitors on price or quality, but also to displace
one anothers products entirely, if possible. In such a market, a dominant rm can acquire
potentially displacing technology and thereby control future innovation, freeing itself from
the burden of innovating further to maintain competitive advantage.4
Furthermore, according to Pollock (2010), search engines display many of the character-
istics of natural monopolies, as their cost structure involves important xed costs, such as
hardware, support, updates, monitoring, but almost zero marginal costs on both the user
and advertiser side of the market. This reinforces the tendency of this market to concentra-
tion. Possible strategies that might reinforce this trend are exclusions from own property or
refusals to deal with competitors downstream (if the search engine is vertically integrated to
specialized search or other services/products), anti-competitive capacity building or passive
investment in competitorss business to maintain the dominant position in the upstream
market (the so called structural abuses in EU competition law), bundling and tying.
Another example of "abusive behavior" by a dominant rm is exclusivity clauses in
contracts with advertisers (see e.g. AdSence contracts with advertisers). In these cases the
dominant rm may employ strategies reducing multi-homing by advertisers in the form of
obstacles to the simultaneous use by advertisers of several search-based ads platforms. It
has already been recognized that multi-homing by advertisers will enhance the development
of scale, e¢ ciency, and innovation for minor search platforms, while any policy aimed at
limiting multi-homing creates obstacles to network e¤ects (see e.g. Etro (2011b)).
An important aspect of the internet search market is its high levels of concentration.
According to recent data, in the US, Google had a market share of 66.2%, Yahoo of 16.4%,
and Bing of 11.8%. In the UK, just as in many other European countries, Google had a
4One of the main sources of this potentially displacing technology in the search engine market is the
upstream market for talented creative programmers and software developers. As illustrated by Helft (2011)
(New York Times) this market is quite thin and companies like Google or Facebook are willing to pay
millions for young talented engineers. If a dominant rm (e.g. Google) buys out all the valuable resources
(e.g. programmers with certain skills), these valuable upstream resources would be unavailable or too costly
for other search engines, which may make it impossible for them to compete in quality dimension (and might
reduce the quality of the search results even further).
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market share of 90.83%, Yahoo of 3.21%, and Bing of 3.12%. See Pollock (2010) or Argenton
and Prüfer (2012) for more detailed overviews. The basic conclusion is that a single rm
(Google) is emerging to dominate the market at least in the US and in Europe.5 The threat of
domination and exclusionary conduct by dominant rms becomes even stronger in the search
engine market, since it can result not only in excessive pricing for advertisers, but also in
reduction of quality of search results, which harms both advertisers and users. Another
concern is that excessive dominance in the search engine markets can harm competition in
the upstream markets that are the main source of quality improving innovations in the search
engine market itself.
The study assumes that the relevant market is online search advertising, for the simple
reason that the European Union has already found in a number of its decisions that online
advertising constitutes a separate market.6 One might object to this nding by arguing that
online search advertising competes with online non-search (social media-based) advertising
(e.g. Facebook), hence Googles market share in online search does not indicate the existence
of a dominant position. However, the impact of online non-search advertising on online search
advertising revenue is for the moment relatively small.7
This paper analyzes a number of specic features of the search engine market from an
economic perspective and incorporates the analysis of quality improving capital investments
in a two-sided model of monopolistic internet search engine market. Our ndings show that
a monopoly platform results in higher prices and under-investment in quality improving
innovations by a search engine relative to the social optimum. We nd that there is a
threat of reduction in the quality of search results, if search engine market is monopolized
or dominated by a single rm (such as e.g. Google). In the more technical companion
paper Motchenkova et al. (2012)8 we extend the model to an asymmetric oligopoly setting,
5Google may not however dispose of a high enough market share if one includes among its competitors
Amazon in the category of "product search". See, the recent discussion of this issue by Claire Caine Miller
& Stephanie Cli¤ord, Google Struggles to Unseat Amazon as the Webs Most Popular Mall, New York
Times (September 9, 2012) and Hal Singer, Who Competes With Google Search? Just Amazon, Apple And
Facebook, Forbes (September 18, 2012).
6See, Case IV/JV.1  Telia/Telenor/Schibstedt, 27 May 1998, Case IV/M.1439  Telia/Telenor,
3 October 1999 and Case IV/M.0048  Vodafone/Vivendi/Canal Plus, 20 July 2000; COMP/M.4731
Google/DoubleClick, 11 March 2008 and COMP/ M.5727 Microsoft/Yahoo! Search business, 18 Feb-
ruary 2010.
7For example, see the European Commissions inconclusive approach in COMP/M.4731
Google/DoubleClick, 11 March 2008, par 52-54. For an excellent analysis of this issue, see, Florence
Thepot, Market Power in Online Search and Social Networking: A Matter of Two-Sided Markets, CLES
Working Paper, 2012, forth.
8Extending the model to an oligopoly setting is a natural step forward. It is a better description of the
current practice with several engines competing in the search market (such as Google, Bing, Yahoo, ect. . . ).
Moreover an oligopoly set-up would also be more appropriate in the setting where online search advertising
and online non-search advertising are substitutable and hence Facebook constraints Google or if the relevant
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where we analyze the interplay between market dominance, network e¤ects, and incentives
to innovate in the search engine market. We also analyze the implications of the market
dominance and network e¤ectsasymmetries for pricing and the quality of search results.
The results we obtain are similar to the results in Argenton and Prüfer (2012). In simple
oligopoly settings they also observe that monopolization of the search engine market has
negative e¤ects on the expected average search quality, the rate of innovation, consumer
surplus, and total welfare. They nd that there is a strong tendency towards market tipping
and, subsequently, monopolization, with negative consequences for economic welfare. As
a remedy they propose to require search engines to share their data on previous searches.
Presumably, this would level the playing eld in the quality dimension.
In our model, which is a modication of Armstrongs (2006) approach, we endogenize
both pricing and quality decisions on both sides of the platform. In this framework we
analyze possible abusive behavior by a dominant search engine, and how it inuences the
level of quality improving innovations. Our results are complementary to results of the
oligopoly model in Argenton and Prüfer (2012), where only quality choices are endogenized.
The structure of the paper is as follows. We begin in section 2 with a literature review. In
section 3 we give an overview of the legal issues the search engine market raises for antitrust
policy through analysis of several types of abusive behavior by the dominant search engine.
We also discuss the possible consequences of monopolization of the search engine market
for advertisers and users. In Section 4 we incorporate the specic features of a search
engine market into a two-sided model of monopolistic internet search engine. Further, we
employ the two-sided framework in order to analyze abusive conduct in the online search
advertising market. There we compare the results under social optimum to the performance
of a monopolist and show that monopoly results in under-provision of quality relative to the
social optimum.9 Section 5 concludes and discusses possible remedies to address the above
mentioned deciencies. We argue that the evidence on increasing concentration and the
theoretical results in the paper suggest that some form of intervention is needed in order to
avoid abusive behavior by the dominant platform and to prevent the deterioration in quality
and relevance of search results.
market is broader than online search and includes product search, hence nding that Amazon also competes
with Google.
9In the more technical companion paper Motchenkova et al. (2012) we conrm that similar results hold
in a two-sided oligopolistic market that is dominated by a single platform for a range of policy relevant
parameter values.
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2 Related Literature
Most of the existing literature focuses on the advertising side of search engines (see e.g.
Edelman et al. (2007), Varian (2007), Ellison and Ellison (2004), Chen and He (2006), or
Athey and Ellison (2011)). In this leterature, search engines are seen as a way for consumers
to nd commercial services or products they want or as some from of improved yellow
pages. Given the two-sided nature of search and its similarity to yellow-pages, the obvious
analytical tools to use would be those developed in the literature on two-sided markets
(see e.g. Rochet and Tirole (2003, 2006), Caillaud and Jullien (2003), Armstrong (2006),
Armstrong and Wright (2007), or Gomes (2010)). The search engine business ts well within
the models of two-sided markets after some proper modication and adaptation of existing
models and taking into account the importance of quality improving capital investments
(or innovation e¤orts) by the platform. This point will be central to our analysis and it
di¤erentiates our analysis from much of the existing literature. The issue of quality and
innovations has not been addressed in the theoretical literature on two-sided markets so
far. Moreover, also surprisingly, there are very few attempts to model a search engine as a
two-sided platform (exceptions are Jeon, Jullien, and Klimenko (2011), and Halaburda and
Yehezkel (2011)).
Another stream of the literature looks at the importance of the quality of information
provided by the search engine, but does not take into account its two-sidedness and alleged
network externalities (see e.g. Pollock (2010) and White (2008)). The approach we take
is also very di¤erent from Pollock (2010) and White (2008), while it still emphasizes the
importance of quality considerations for the search engine market. Turning to our approach,
it should be stressed that the two primary groups a search engine sits between are users
and advertisers. There are many examples of markets in which two or more groups of
agents interact via intermediaries or "platforms." Surplus is created when the groups interact.
However, in some cases also cross-group externalities are present, and the benet enjoyed by
a member of one group depends upon how well the platform does in attracting customers
from the other group. This general idea articulated in Armstrong (2006) seems to t very
well the situation in an internet search engine market with end users on the one side and
advertisers on the other side, where quality of the search engine is important for both sides.
Furthermore, a two-sided markets framework is convenient to analyze multi-homing by users
and advertisers and the e¤ects of strategies by dominant platform that limit multi-homing
on either side of the market (see e.g. Armstrong and Wright (2007)).
Further, there is a number of articles on determination of the relevant market for on-
line advertising, which highlight the di¤erences between online and traditional advertising
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and also between displayed and search-based advertising, within the class of online adver-
tising. The recent examples are Ratli¤ and Rubineld (2010), Etro (2011), Evans (2009), or
Goldfarb and Tucker (2011). See also French Competition Authority report (2010). These
references imply that there is no substitutability between online and traditional advertising
and only limited substitutability between displayed and search-based advertising. Hence,
search-based advertising can be considered as a separate market. In this paper we mainly
concentrate on the market for search-based advertising, where two-sided aspect and inno-
vation incentives aimed at increasing quality and relevance of search results play a crucial
role. For the search-based advertising segment of the market the technology of matching
adds on the one side to search queries by users on the other side is essential. Search-based
advertising is facilitated by the search platform and, actually, can only exist on the basis of
such a platform.
3 Overview of the Legal Issues
A recent investigation by the European Commission identied four concerns where Google
business practices may be considered as abuses of dominance.10 Firstly, in its general search
results on the Web, Google displays links to its own vertical search services di¤erently than
it does for links to competitors. In connection to this the European Commission expresses
concerns that this may result in preferential treatment compared to that provided to com-
peting services. Secondly, there is a concern that Google may be copying original material
from the websites of its competitors and using that material on its own sites without their
prior authorization. In this way Google appropriates the benets of the investments of
competitors. This in turn could reduce competitorsincentives to invest in the creation of
original content for the benet of internet users. The third concern relates to agreements
between Google and partners on the websites of which Google delivers search advertisements.
The agreements result in de facto exclusivity requiring them to obtain all or most of their
requirements of search advertisements from Google, thus shutting out competing providers
of search advertising intermediation services. The Commissions fourth concern relates to
restrictions that Google puts to the portability of online search advertising campaigns from
its own platform to the platforms of competitors. There is a risk that Google imposes con-
10See, the recent investigations of Google by DG Competition of the European Commission in Case 39740
Foundem/Google; Case 39768 Ciao / Google; Case 39775 1plusV/Google (30.11.2010). The Commission
has not also excluded the possibility of opening investigations for other related markets, such as applica-
tions for mobile phones. See Charles Arthur, Google faces mobile services pressure in antitrust case, The
Guardian (July 20, 2012) reporting European Commissioners Almunia statements. See the EC website at
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/12/372&format=HTML&aged=0&
language=EN&guiLanguage=en.
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tractual restrictions on software developers which prevent them from o¤ering tools that allow
the seamless transfer of search advertising campaigns across AdWords and other platforms
for search advertising.
In this section of the paper we identify some competition law issues arising from the above
discussion of the recent concerns outlined by the European Commission. We identify three
types of abuses: these are strategies reducing multi-homing, leveraging, and exploitative
practices. All of these strategies reinforce the trend towards increasing concentration in the
search engine market even further. We will discuss each of them in the subsequent three
sub-sections, respectively. In the formal analysis section we address the consequences of
monopolization of the search engine market for advertisers and users (in the form of higher
prices than in a perfectly competitive market for advertisers) and deterioration of quality
improving innovation e¤orts by a dominant search engine, which can inict negative impact
on both users and advertisers in the form of reduction in the quality and relevance of search
results.
3.1 Strategies reducing multi-homing
We assume the dominant position of Google in the paid search market, because of its high
market shares (more than 50%)11 and the existence of barriers to entry in the form of network
e¤ects and the substantial xed costs related to R&D or the development and maintenance
of service infrastructure. Search engines do not operate as neutral platforms but may adopt
strategies to increase their revenue and thus optimize advertising and placement prots.
This can be achieved by reducing multi-homing at the advertising and the end users side of
the market (the two being interlinked). Strategies reducing multi-homing may take di¤erent
forms.
As previously noted, in November 2010, the Commission decided to initiate proceedings
under Article 102 TFEU against Google for a number of practices, including the alleged
imposition of exclusivity obligations by Google on its advertising and distribution partners,
preventing them from placing certain types of competing ads on their web sites, as well as
on computer and software vendors, with the aim of shutting out competing search tools and
for suspected restrictions on advertisers as to the portability of campaign data to competing
online advertising platforms, again in order to limit the multi-homing of online advertising
campaigns.12 In an opinion delivered in December 2010 on the competitive operation of
11The European Commission has cited data proving that Google has a market share for paid search in
Europe of more than 95% of the market. See, J. Almunia, Competition in Digital Media and the Internet,
UCL Jevons Institute Lecture, London, 7 July 2010, SPEECH/10/365.
12European Commission, Antitrust: Commission probes allegations of antitrust violations by Google,
November 30th, 2010, IP/10/1624; Cases COMP/C-3/39.740, COMP/C-3/39.775 & COMP/C-3/39.768.
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online advertising, in the context of its consultative function to the French government,
the French Competition Authority (FCA) also noted the existence of high entry barriers in
the industry and the possibility that Google might use a number of practices to increase
barriers to entry and thus maintain or reinforce its dominant position in the paid search
market.13 The FCA provided survey evidence that the privileged position of Google as a
percentage of queries constitutes the main justication for opening AdWords account by
advertisers. The high xed costs of developing algorithms and hosting pages (corresponding
to several hundreds of millions of Euros), the enhancement of the algorithm by the size of
the search engine and the number of queries it receives, as well as Googles lead with regard
to exhausting indexing on the end userspart of the market, combined with the lack of tra¢ c
on other search engines and the di¢ culty of launching an alternative search engine, on the
advertisersside of the two-sided market, led the FCA to conclude that the one click away
competitionargument advanced by Google does not hold, at least for the advertisersside
of the market. Relying on its market position and the high barriers to entry, Google could
thus adopt practices that would aim to marginalize or exclude its competitors in the paid
search market, in particular by articially putting up barriers to entry in the search engine
or search-based ads market. These can be of contractual or technical nature. The FCA listed
among these practices, the existence of exclusive agreements related to indexed content, the
inclusion of exclusivity clauses in the AdSence contracts concluded between Google and the
advertisers, obstacles to competing search engines by content web-sites controlled by Google,
such as YouTube and obstacles to the simultaneous use by advertisers of several search-based
ads platforms. One could also add to this list input foreclosure of the upstream market of
programmers and software developers by Google.
Several of these practices may fall under the scope of EU competition law, and in par-
ticular Article 102 TFEU (for both contractual and unilateral practices, although there is a
possibility that Article 101 TFEU may apply to the former). It is also advisable to adopt a
precautionary ex ante approach and subject to scrutiny merger activity that enhances the
dominant position of Google and its capacity to reduce multi-homing (this aspect is not
examined in this paper).
Concerning antitrust enforcement, the exclusivity strategies adopted by Google are likely
to foreclose its competitors, search engines, from an important customer base (customer
foreclosure) of advertisers and thus lead to their marginalization/exclusion, the subsequent
reduction of innovation in the search engine market and eventually consumer harm. We have
no information on the exact magnitude of customer foreclosure that may result from Googles
13French Competition Authority, Opinion No. 10-A-29, December 14, 2010 on the competitive operation
of online advertising.
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activities, such as the one referred to in the complaints at the European Commission. It
is nevertheless clear that a foreclosure of competing engines from an important part of the
advertising market through contractual or de facto exclusivity arrangements might reduce
their ability to achieve the minimum e¢ cient scale and thus to compete e¤ectively with
Google. The theory of harm (anti-competitive foreclosure) advanced in this case could be
that by blocking competing search advertisers from gaining the requisite level of search
tra¢ c necessary to maintain a viable and competitive search advertising platform, Google
has abused its dominant position.
These practices fall certainly within the scope of EU competition law, in particular Article
102 TFEU. In Suiker Unie v Commission the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU)
noted that exclusivity may be an abuse if competitors are left with no available distribution
channels through which they can market their products on a su¢ ciently large scale.14 In
British Gypsum, the General Court held that exclusive dealing was only abusive when it
applied to a substantial proportion of purchases, concluding that in these circumstances,
exclusivity would be an unacceptable obstacle to market entry.15 The General Court,
conrmed by the CJEU, has also found in Van den Bergh Foods Ltd v Commission that
the exclusivity might not result from specic legal obligations, but may take the form of de
facto exclusivity: in this case, an ice cream supplier had abused its dominant position by
o¤ering an exclusive freezer cabinet free of charge to retailers who did not have their own
freezer cabinet or a freezer cabinet supplied by a competitor. According to the Court, the
tying of 40 per cent of outlets on the relevant market was an abuse because it had the e¤ect
of foreclosing competitors even if there was demand for their products.16
The European Commission has spelled out in its recent Enforcement priorities guidance,
the main features of the competition analysis to be followed in exclusionary abuse cases.17
First, the Commission will have to establish the existence of an anti-competitive foreclosure
by looking to the position of the dominant undertaking (a super-dominant rm with high
market shares undertakes a special responsibility to protect the competitive process), the po-
sition of customers and the di¢ culties they might have to switch or to counter the conduct
of the dominant undertaking, the extent of the alleged abusive conduct (for example its du-
ration), actual evidence of foreclosure (for example, following the adoption of such practices
the market shares of the dominant undertaking have risen sharply), the existence of internal
14Joined cases 40 to 48, 50, 54 to 56, 111, 113 and 114/73 Coöperatieve Vereniging "Suiker Unie" UA v
Commission, para 486.
15Case T-65/89 British Gypsum, paras 66 - 68.
16Case T-65/98 Van den Bergh Foods Ltd v Commission [2003] ECR II-4653 paras 159 - 160.
17Communication from the Commission Guidance on the Commissions enforcement priorities in applying
Article 82 of the EC Treaty to abusive exclusionary conduct by dominant undertakings [2009] OJ C 45/2.
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documents and other direct evidence of exclusionary strategy. According to the Commission,
it is easier to establish the nding of anti-competitive foreclosure, with regard to exclusive
purchasing, if the dominant rm is an unavoidable trade partner for all or most customers
(advertisers here), in which case even an exclusive purchasing obligation of short duration
can lead to anti-competitive foreclosure. The dominant rm has of course the ability to
argue e¢ ciencies, but it is highly unlikely in practice that these will be able to outweigh the
anti-competitive e¤ects and they have never done so for Article 102 TFEU cases, in partic-
ular for a rm with the alleged dominant position of Google.18 The Commissions priority
guidance does not provide an exact gure for assessing the degree of customer foreclosure
required for the application of Article 102 TFEU. Nevertheless, the Commissions Guidelines
on vertical restraints suggest that for single branding practices, it is likely that they will not
benet from Article 101(3) if the foreclosure at the retail level is higher than 30% or 40%,
and this for non-dominant undertakings in the primary market/wholesale level. It follows
that in presence of a dominant undertaking, lower levels of input/customer foreclosure may
be su¢ cient to prove anti-competitive foreclosure and thus an infringement of Articles 102
TFEU (and also probably 101 TFEU).
These thresholds are not substantially di¤erent from those required in US antitrust law
for the application of Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act. US antitrust law traditionally
nds no antitrust concern if the foreclosure percentage is less than 40%, for exclusive dealing
agreements concluded by a monopolist,19 although there have been cases where a lower
percentage of foreclosure was found su¢ cient for establishing antitrust liability.20 The Trade-
Comet complaints in the US against Google could have given the occasion to US courts to
clarify the interpretation of the case law with regard to single branding practices, but they
were dismissed for procedural reasons.21
In conclusion, one could make an arguable case of anti-competitive foreclosure if there is
18In view of the fact that the Court applies a proportionality test instead of a trade-of between the e¢ ciency
gains and the anticompetitive e¤ects, hence an undertaking with high market shares may be disadvantaged
in defending its conduct by arguing e¢ ciencies: Case C-52/09, Konkurrenverket v. TeliaSonera Sverige AB,
[February 17, 2011], not yet published, para. 76 (noting that if the exclusionary e¤ect of that [conduct]
bears no relation to advantages for the market and consumers, or if it goes beyond what is necessary in order
to attain those advantages, that practice must be regarded as an abuse).
19Je¤erson Parish Hosp. Dist./ No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 7 (1984).
20United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 70-71 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
21Available at http://www.courthousenews.com/2010/03/08/Google%20opinion.pdf According to the
complaint, (I) Google entered into exclusive syndication agreements with certain high-tra¢ c online pub-
lishers, thus foreclosing competing search advertising platforms from an important source of paid search
revenue, (ii) Google restricted advertisers access to data at AdWords that would have made it easier for
them to evaluate the performance of their advertising campaigns and to switch or add competing advertising
platforms and (iii) Google deployed default mechanisms that make it di¢ cult for users to select a search
engine other than Google.
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evidence of a foreclosure of at least 40% of the online search advertising business from rival
search advertising platforms. It will be, however, important also to prove that competing
advertising platforms need to have access to high-tra¢ c websites to build scale, that is,
search engines are an e¤ective distribution method for advertising. For example, advertisers
might have access to vertical or nichesearch engine providers, alternative horizontal search
engines, which might have a more signicant market share in specic geographic markets,
such as Seznam in Czech republic (outside the EU market one could cite Baidu for China,
Blekko for the US, Yandex for Russia). Blocking an entire distribution channel, such as
search advertising, is likely to be considered as leading to substantial foreclosure of the
market. However, it is important to distinguish between di¤erent types of search: query
navigation, where a user needs to nd a specic web site which he knows or assumes to be
present on the Web, should be distinguished from transactional navigation, where the user
aims to reach a destination where a further market interaction will take place (Hoboken,
2012). For advertisers, it is the latest category of search which is of importance as this can
lead to the purchase of a product or a service. Crane notes that Google accounts for less
than half of the volume of tra¢ c of the websites where market transactions are held (Crane,
2011). This share might be even smaller for Web sites that have developed a strong and
recognizable brand, such as the big travel search sites, Expedia, Travelocity and Priceline.
This is certainly an empirical question.
Yet, these practices may reinforce concentration in this market, which, as we will show
in the following sections, may lead to consumer harm. First, a monopolist has incentives to
reduce the quality of the search engine for the organic search results valued by end users.
Second, innovation in the market may also be a¤ected.22
3.2 Leveraging
Google or the market leader in the search engine market may also attempt to leverage its
market power to enhance the market position (and market power eventually) of the Internet
web-sites they control (e.g. Google and the promotion of Google Maps, or Google Books).
In particular, Google has diversied its activities in search related activities, such as dig-
itizing documentary collections of certain university libraries and private editors (Google
Books), o¤ering new specialized search engines relating to News (Google News), price com-
parison websites (Google Shopping), maps (Google maps), videos (YouTube), the Internet
browser Google Chrome, online applications (such as cloud computing) and other services
and applications (including technologies for marketing and disseminating advertising, such
22These results are conrmed in presence of a dominant rm in the oligopolistic market of paid search in
a companion paper Motchenkova et al (2012).
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as DoubleClick). Some of these ancillary activities may maintain or strengthen Googles
position in the paid advertising search market (defensive leveraging).
Some of the complaints leveled against Google at the European Commission include al-
legations of leveraging. First, Google has been accused of lowering the ranking of organic
search results of competing vertical search engines, such as Foundem, and of raising the rank-
ing of its own competing services. The Commission is investigating how Googles algorithms
rank search results (are the algorithms for Googles products the same than for its competi-
tors?), or if Google has employed targeted measures, such as black-listing or white-listing of
particular websites. Google opposes these allegations by putting forward the argument that
it is not in its interests to bias the presentation of search results, as end users may detect
this reduction of the quality of the search engine (in terms of relevance) and then turn to
competing search engines. Second, the complainants allege that Google lowered the qual-
ity scorefor sponsored links of competing vertical search providers. Similar concerns have
been identied by the French Competition Authority. In its Navx decision, the FCA dealt
with the sudden closure of Navxs AdWordsaccount by Google for violation of its content
policy. The FCA considered that such closure without warning was discriminatory and non-
transparent and asked Google to re-establish Navxaccount and to ensure the transparency
of its content policy. Google proposed commitments as to the transparency of AdWords.23
In its investigation on the competitive operation of online advertising,24 the FCA also noted
that Google and its subsidiaries participated to the Ad Words service bidding, by purchas-
ing keywords related to their activity, thus articially raising the cost for competing vertical
search engines or competitors of Googles ancillary services and increasing the tra¢ c on its
site (and consequently its advertising revenues). This exclusionary bidding may exclude or
marginalize competitors and thus constitute a competition law infringement.
The factual background of these allegations is highly imprecise and contested. For exam-
ple, the existence of a bias of Google for its own services is widely debated and constitutes
after all an empirical issue that cannot be examined in this study.25 Should these allega-
tions be true, however, it is likely that this might increase the web tra¢ c of Googles well
established ancillary services, as users are more likely to click on a result guring at the
top of the rankings and subsequently to purchase services from this website (Yang & Ghose,
2010). By biasing its search results against competing vertical services, Google may thus
cause their exclusion from the market, because of lower end user and advertising revenues
exposure (input foreclosure). The single monopoly prot theorem will not limit the incentive
23French Competition Authority, decision 10-D-30.
24See, Opinion No 10-A-29 of 14 December 2010 on the competitive operation of online advertising,
available at http://www.autoritedelaconcurrence.fr/doc/10a29_en.pdf, p. 44.
25Compare, for example, Endelman & Lockwood (2011) with Wright (2011).
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of Google to proceed with this vertical input foreclosure strategy: rst because Google is
not charging end users for the organic search, second because the strict conditions of the
monopoly prot theorem do not apply in this context (Elhauge, 2009). Consumer harm
for end users follows from the higher level of market concentration that will result from the
exclusion of vertical search engines or other competing websites as well as the decrease of
the quality of the search engine (in view of the substitution between organic results and
sponsored results or deterioration of quality of search algorithms), and of lower innovation
rates in the industry (see the following sections). Advertisers will also have to pay higher
advertising charges, following the reduction of competition by vertical search engines and
other websites, and the extension of Googles market power.
The application of EU competition law raises interesting questions. It is possible to
conceive Googles universal search engine as an indispensable distribution tool, a sort of
essential facility to which competing vertical search engines and websites should have access
to. For example, in Oscar Bronner, the Court of Justice of the EU examined if access to a
home delivery distribution network was indispensable for the distribution of daily press.26
As it was previously noted, the cost structure of Googles universal search engine is close to
that of natural monopolies (important xed costs and low marginal costs), thus making it
theoretically possible for the plainti¤ to prove that the creation of a universal search engine
is not a realistic potential alternative and that access to the existing system is therefore
indispensable. Indeed, it is clear since the case law of the Court in Oscar Bronner that it
is not enough to argue that it is not economically viable by reason of the small circulation
(in this case tra¢ c of the website) to establish this new universal search platform. (I)t
would be necessary at the very least to establish [. . . ] that it is not economically viable to
create a (second universal search platform) with a circulation (tra¢ c) comparable to that
of (Google).27 It is clear that such evidence will be particularly di¢ cult to bring for the
plainti¤ and in any case requires some concrete empirical analysis.
The recent judgment of the Court in TeliaSonera indicates nevertheless that proving the
indispensabilityof access to the input controlled by the dominant rm might not be such
a di¢ cult condition to full for plainti¤s after all, and it might not even be required for
the application of Article 102 TFEU to discriminatory practices by a dominant undertaking.
First, it is only a requirement for refusals to supply and not for other types of abuses,
such as the supply of services or selling of goods on conditions which are disadvantageous
or in which there might be no purchaser.28 According to the Court, the e¤ectiveness of
26Case C-7/97 Oscar Bronner GmbH Co. v. Mediaprint [1998] ECR I-7791.
27Ibid.
28Case C-52/09 Konkurrensverket v. TeliaSonera Sverige AB, February 17, 2011, para. 55.
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Article 102 TFEU might be compromised if the limiting principles for imposing a duty
to deal, proclaimed in Oscar Bronner, were transposed from refusals to deal to all types
of abuses.29 At best, the Court envisions the condition of indispensability as a tool to
unveil if the undertakings excluded are at least as e¢ cient as the dominant undertaking.
However, the Court examines also if the practice might be capable of having anti-competitive
e¤ects on the markets concerned, even when the wholesale product/service or input is not
indispensable.30 Second, there is no need to provide evidence of actual anti-competitive
e¤ects, the potential exclusion of an equally e¢ cient competitor is a su¢ cient condition for
Article 102 TFEU to apply.31 It becomes thus clear that proving the indispensability of
access to the dominant rms input collapses to proving the possibility that equally e¢ cient
competitors may potentially be excluded. The cost structure of the dominant undertaking is
of course the rst element to consider for price related practices. But the Court is also open to
the possibility that the level of the dominant undertakings costs is specically attributable
to the competitively advantageous situation in which its dominant position places it, in the
absence of information on the dominant rms costs. This of course places Google or, any
other rm controlling the search market to a di¢ cult stance, as they will be deemed enjoying
an advantageous situation, should the relevant market be dened as that of online search.
Indeed, search might be conceived as a pivotal product/service, which if controlled might
inuence the e¤ectiveness of competition in a lot of related markets. The General Court
also considered the possible application of the Oscar Bronner criterion of indispensability
of access to other forms of abuses in Kingdom of Spain v. Commission,32 again a margin
squeeze case, and noted the following:
74. The Court of Justice has made it clear that it cannot be inferred from Bronner that
the conditions to be met in order to establish that a refusal to supply is abusive must
necessarily also apply when assessing the abusive nature of conduct which consists in
supplying services or selling goods on conditions which are disadvantageous or on which
there might be no purchaser. Such conduct may, in itself, constitute an independent
form of abuse distinct from that of refusal to supply.
29Ibid., para. 58.
30Ibid., para. 72.
31Case C-209/10, Post Danmark A/S v. Konkurrencerädet [March 27, 2011], not yet published, para.
25; Case T-398/07, Kingdom of Spain v. European Commission [March 29, 2012], not yet published, para,
90-92 (for price related abuses). For no-price related abuses, there is no explicit additional requirement for
an as e¢ cient as competitor test: Communication - Guidance on the Commissions enforcement priorities in
applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty to abusive exclusionary conduct by dominant undertakings, [2009] OJ
C/7, para. 19-21.
32Case T-398/07, Kingdom of Spain v. European Commission [March 29, 2012], not yet published, para
68.
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75. If Bronner were to be interpreted otherwise, that would amount to a requirement
that before any conduct of a dominant undertaking in relation to its terms of trade
could be regarded as abusive the conditions to be met to establish that there was a
refusal to supply would in every case have to be satised, and that would unduly reduce
the e¤ectiveness of Article [102 TFEU].
Hence, the indispensability condition does not work outside a clear refusal to deal frame-
work. Yet, it seems unclear how Googles practices might be qualied as a refusal to deal,
as Google does not refuse to provide access to its search engine, but only avoids to list the
websites of its vertical competitors at the rst places in the ranking. Could the refusal to
deal be presented as a refusal to grant access to the highest ranking in the search engine?
Should this proposition be accepted, every company whose website is not highly ranked (or
at least ranked at the rst page of the search results) could bring an antitrust case against
Google, should Google be an actual or potential competitor with it at a vertical level. . . One
can immediately understand that such characterization of the facts of the case leads to a
potential unlimited liability for Google and cannot of course be of its interest. This leaves
us of course unsettled as to the exact characterization of the alleged abuse by Google of its
dominant position.
Another avenue is o¤ered by some older case law where a duty to deal in a non-discriminatory
manner was imposed on the dominant undertaking. The main issue raised in not the refusal
of Google to grant access to its search engine,33 but to discriminate between its own ser-
vices and those of its competitors. As the Commission explains in its Enforcement Priorities
Guidance (2009, para 76), typically competition problems arise when the dominant under-
taking competes on the "downstream" market with the buyer whom it refuses to supply,
the term "downstream market" referring to the market for which the refused input is needed
in order to manufacture a product or provide a service. The same conclusion imposes itself
with regard to discriminatory practices. In Sabre/Amadeus, a statement of objections was
sent to Air France for allegedly discriminating by refusing to provide Sabre (a competing
Computer Reservation System owned by British Airways and American Airlines) with the
same information and at the same time it was providing it to its own CRS, Amadeus.34 In
British Midland v Aer Lingus, the abuse was Aer Linguss refusal to provide interline facil-
ities to British Midland when the latter entered the London Heathrow Dublin route. 35
British Midland could compete e¤ectively and operate protably over time. The refusal to
33One could think of applying here the classic essential facilitiescases of Sealink/B&I Holyhead [1992]
CMLR 255; Sea Containers v. Stena Sealink [1994] OJ L 15/8.
34Commission, Press Release IP/00/835 (2000).
35British Midland v Aer Lingus [1992] OJ L96/34, para. 14 30.
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supply, however, raised its costs and shrank its revenues. Aer Lingus had provided interlining
facilities to British Midland before on other routes. The refusal to interline was clearly a
reaction to entry aimed at protecting the dominant position on the relevant market.36 The
European Commission has also recently launched an investigation with regard to Apples
policy to impose through its license agreement with independent developers a requirement
to use only Apples native programming tools and approved languages when writing iPhone
apps, to the detriment of third-party layers.37 For the Commission, this practice could have
ultimately resulted in shutting out competition from devices running platforms other than
Apples. Following the launch of the investigation by the Commission, Apple removed these
restrictions, restoring the use of third-party layers and so giving developers more exibility.
Should it be proven that Google has terminated contracts and cancelled AdWords ac-
counts for vertically competing undertakings, the practice may also fall under the classic
Commercial Solvents jurisprudence of the Court, a case concerning refusal to supply an in-
dispensable raw material, regarding the termination of existing supply relationships.38 In
Commercial Solvents, the Court did not require a nding of consumer harm for an abusive
refusal to supply to be established but took the view that the impairment of an e¤ective
competitive structure in the EU was su¢ cient. In Clearstream, a case concerning access to
the Clearstream security clearance system, which was an unavoidable business partner as
the only holder of German securities kept in collective safe custody, the Commission found
that not supplying its downstream competitor, Euroclear Bank, harmed innovation and com-
petition in the provision of cross border services and ultimately the consumers within the
single market.39 The Court of First Instance (now the General Court) held that the conduct
had the tendency to harm innovation and, ultimately, customers of cross-border secondary
clearing and settlement services.40 The amount and cogency of evidence required for the
proof of anticompetitive e¤ect is thus lower than that required in Oscar Bronner for refusals
to supply (eliminating all competition on the part of the undertaking requesting access) or
Magill and IMS/NDC Health for refusals to license (elimination of all competition on the
market) or in Microsoft for refusal to provide interoperability (elimination of all e¤ective
competition, Nazzini, 2012).41
36 ibid, para. 26.
37Antitrust: Statement on Apples iPhone policy changes, IP/10/1175, September 25, 2010.
38Joined cases 6-7/73, Istituto Chemioterapico Italiano S.p.A. and Commercial Solvents Corporation v
Commission [1974] 223.
39European Commission, Clearstream [2009] OJ C165/7, paras 228, 231, and 232
40Case T-301/04 Clearstream Banking AG and Clearstream International SA v Commission [2009] ECR
II-3155, para 149.
41Case T-69/89 Radio Teles Eireann v Commission [1991] II-485 (Magill), appeal dismissed in Case C-
241/91 and 242/91 P Magill ; Case C-418/01 IMS Health GmbH & Co OHG v NDC Health GmbH & Co KG
[2004] ECR I-5039; Case T-201/04 Microsoft Corpn v Commission [2007] ECR II-3601.
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A further option is to characterize the conduct as some form of tying. Google may
be found to have tied universal search with specialized search tools, which are allegedly
two separate products. This could qualify as technical tying in EU competition law, as
the two distinct products are integrated in one (Googles Universal search). One might
quickly understand why it would be a good strategy for Googles competitors to insist on
such theory of harm. In order to succeed a tying case in EU competition law, the plainti¤
needs to prove that (i) the tying and the tied products are two separate products, (ii) the
undertaking concerned is dominant in the market for the tying product, (iii) the practice (an
agreement or technological integration) does not give customers a choice to obtain the tying
product without the tied product (coercion), and (iv) the practice in question forecloses
competition.42 These are generally easier conditions to satisfy than the standards of the
CJEU on refusals to deal, as once there is tying of two distinct products and the undertaking
is dominant, a simple likelihood of anticompetitive e¤ects may be su¢ cient evidence for the
application of Article 102 TFEU.
Certainly, Google may argue that Universal search and specialized search tools are one
product, rather than distinct ones, as search users would not likely integrate universal search
with specialized search in the absence of a combined o¤ering. Furthermore, in the US context,
the distinct product rule has been abandoned for technical tying as it was thought backward-
looking and therefore systematically a poor proxy for overall e¢ ciency in the presence of new
and innovative integration.43 These arguments notwithstanding, the separate product test
is more supply-oriented in EU competition law (Economides and Lianos, 2009). First, for
a product to be considered distinct, it should not necessarily constitute a relevant market
test: two products may be su¢ ciently di¤erentiated that a company can be found to tie or
bundle two distinct products. Second, the existence of di¤erent sources of supply and, in
particular, of competing suppliers of the alleged tied product may provide an indication that
the products are distinct.44 The presence of undertakings specialized in the manufacture
42Case T 201/04, Microsoft Corp. v. Commission of the European Communities [2007] ECR II-3601.
The European Commission in its Guidance on its enforcement priorities in applying Article 102 TFEU to
abusive exclusionary conduct to dominant undertakings, [2009] OJ C 45/7, para. 50 does not refer to the
condition of coerción. Indeed, some authors have previously argued that it is redundant (Economides and
Lianos, 2009, at 519).
United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 89 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
43United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 89 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
44The Court noted that a not insignicant number of customers continue to acquire media players from
Microsofts competitors, separately from their client PC operating system, which shows that they regard the
two products as separate: Case T 201/04, Microsoft Corp. v. Commission of the European Communities
[2007] ECR II-3601, para. 932. The Commissions Enforcement Priorities Guidance also emphasizes the
supply side by nding that two products are distinct if, in the absence of tying or bundling, a substantial
number of customers would purchase or would have purchased the tying product without also buying the
tied product from the same supplier, thereby allowing standalone production for both the tying and the tied
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and sale of the tied product without the tying product constitutes indirect evidence of the
distinctness of the products. If we follow these rules in our case, the existence of a signicant
number of undertakings present only in the specialized (vertical) search may be a factor
indicating that universal search and specialized search are distinct products.
The requirement of anticompetitive foreclosure can also be easily established by the
plainti¤ in tying cases. In Microsoft, the General Court found that there was a reason-
able likelihoodthat the tying between Windows and WMP would lead to a lessening of
competition so that the maintenance of an e¤ective competition structure would not be
ensured in the foreseeable future.45 A closer look at the alleged anti-competitive e¤ects
and their analysis by the General Court also reveals that most of these anti-competitive
e¤ects were harming consumers indirectly and emanated from the fact that Microsoft as
compared with its media player rivals beneted from an unparalleled advantage with re-
spect to the distribution of its productthat inevitably had signicant consequences for the
structure of competitionon the downstream market.46 The underlying objectives of Article
102, in particular its emphasis on preserving consumer choice in the presence of a rm with
an entrenched dominant position, may explain these relatively strict antitrust standards, in
particular with regard to technical tying.47
A further possibility would be to argue that Googles strategy constitutes a structural
abusesubject to Article 102 TFEU, following the long-established principle in Continental
Can that any commercial practicedamaging the maintenance of an e¤ective competitive
structure should be prohibited. This may happen if the dominant undertaking strengthens
such position in a way that the degree of dominance reached substantially fetters com-
petition, ie that only undertakings remain in the market whose behavior depends on the
dominant one.48 This might take di¤erent forms, which could include lowering the ranking
of organic search results of competing vertical search engines or the strategy of acquiring
minority shareholdings in number of rms49 with the aim to reinforce the network e¤ects
in the market and entrench ultimately the dominant position of the undertaking. Struc-
product.
45Case T 201/04, above, para. 1089.
46Ibid., para. 1054.
47Enforcement Priorities Guidance, para. 53, (t)he risk of anti-competitive foreclosure is expected to
be greater where the dominant undertaking makes its tying or bundling strategy a lasting one, for example
through technical tying which is costly to reverse. Technical tying also reduces the opportunities for resale
of individual components.
48Case C 6/72 Continental Can Europemballage Corporation and Continental Can Company Inc. v Com-
mission of the European Communities. ECR [1973] 215, para. 26.
49David Gilo, The Anticompetitive e¤ect of passive investment, 99 Michigan Law Review, p. 1-47 (2000),
(nding that passive investment in an industry with only a few rms will raise prices even when rms are
not colluding).
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tural abuses are distinct from other exclusionary abuses, in that the latter are behavioral in
nature,50 hence the conduct requirement has less evidential importance in these cases.
To this extensive scope of Article 102 TFEU that can cover a variety of commercial strate-
gies, one could also add the profound evidential asymmetry that exists in EU competition law
between the standard of proof for anti-competitive e¤ect and that for outweighing e¢ ciency
gains, thus rendering the task of the defendant even more di¢ cult (Lianos, 2009). Despite
the recent rhetoric towards an economic e¤ects-based approach, following the publication of
the Commissions Enforcement Guidance, the case law of the Court of Justice of the EU still
emphasizes the role of principles, such as the protection of the buyers freedom as regards
choice of sources of supplyor the protection of competitorsaccess to the market, which
might seem antithetical to mainstream economics, although the Court makes the e¤ort to
package these principles in a more economics-friendly way, by also applying the as e¢ cient
as competitor test in the context of price related exclusionary abuses.51 Yet, the as e¢ cient
as competitor test has not been extended to non-price abuses, hence theoretically there is
no limitation to the application of competition law in these cases, other than the specic
standards developed for each category of abusive conduct.
Googles practices may thus fall under the scope of Article 102 TFEU, under any of these
specic standards of abuse (i.e. refusal to deal, discrimination, tying, structural abuse. . . ).
The fact that this is a rapidly evolving high technology market may not play a limiting
role in EU competition law enforcement and could thus defeat a claim that imposing a
duty to provide access or to unbundle in such a context, without evidence of actual anti-
competitive e¤ects, might jeopardize the incentives of the dominant rm to innovate and thus
the level of innovation in this market. As the Court noted in TeliaSonera, (p)articularly
in a rapidly growing market, Article 102 TFEU requires action as quickly as possible, to
prevent the formation and consolidation in that market of a competitive structure distorted
by the abusive strategy of an undertaking which has a dominant position on that market
or on a closely linked neighboring market, in other words it requires action before the anti-
competitive e¤ects of that strategy are realized.52 The Commission has also taken a careful
position with regard to the balancing of incentives to innovate in high technology markets.
In its Microsoft case, the Commission did not undertake the di¢ cult task of balancing
incentives to innovate, as it assumed that the incentives of Microsoft would not be hampered
by the prohibition of the refusal to supply interoperability, as innovating was considered a key
50Jonathan Faull & Ali Nikpay (ed.), The EC Law of Competition (OUP, 2007), p. 394.
51Case C-209/10, Post Danmark A/S v. Konkurrencerädet [March 27, 2011], not yet published, para. 21
and 26.
52Case C-52/09 Konkurrensverket v. TeliaSonera Sverige AB, para. 108.
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factor for competing in a fast moving industry.53 The Commission also found that the level
of innovation in the whole industry would also increase, taking into account the incentive
of the competitors of the dominant rm to innovate in the future.54 Similar considerations
may apply in this case, in view of the gatekeeping role of search engines in the development
of the Internet.
3.3 Exploitative practices to Internet users and advertisers
Exploitative practices to Internet users or advertisers (in either side of the market) may take
di¤erent forms. First, the participation of Google and its subsidiaries in AdWords bidding
might lead the amount of the bid not to be proportional to the value of the service but to
include a forcing-out premium. This could arguably constitute an excessive pricing claim,
as it might lead to higher prices than in a perfectly competitive market for advertisers.
The conditions for proving excessive pricing are quite strict in EU competition law thus
imposing a higher standard of persuasion and cogency of evidence for the plainti¤. In United
Brands,55 the Court recognized that excessive prices can amount to an abuse, but found
that the Commission did not meet the burden of proof, as it did not consider all objective
justications for price di¤erentials between di¤erent markets. The Court laid down the
standard for nding excessive pricing as follows:
Charging a price which is excessive because it has no reasonable relation to the eco-
nomic value of the product supplied would be such an abuse. . . The questions... to be
determined are whether the di¤erence between the costs actually incurred and the price
actually charged is excessive, and, if the answer to this question is in the a¢ rmative,
whether a price has been imposed which is either unfair in itself or when compared to
competing products.56
Thus, the cost/price di¤erence must be excessive and the price must either be unfair in
itself or when compared to competing products (yardstick competition). These conditions
are notoriously di¢ cult to prove.
A more recent case may nevertheless be useful for Googles plainti¤s. In Kanal 5 57,
the referring court asked whether the fact that a copyright management organization which
53Commission Decision, Microsoft/W2000 (COMP/C3/37.792), 24 March 2004, para. 725.
54Ibid., para. 783.
55Case 22/76, United Brands v Commission [1978] ECR 207.
56Ibid., para. 250-252.
57Case C-52/07 Kanal 5 Ltd v Föreningen Svedska Tonsättares Internationella Musikbyrå (STIM) UPA
[2009] 5 C.M.L.R. 18.
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enjoys a de facto monopoly in a Member State on the market for making available music pro-
tected by copyright for television broadcasts applies, in respect of the remuneration paid for
that service, a remuneration model according to which the amount of royalties is calculated
on the basis of the revenue of companies broadcasting those works and the amount of music
broadcast constitutes an abuse of a dominant position prohibited by art. 102 TFEU and
whether the fact that another method would enable the use of those works and the audience
to be identied and quantied more precisely may have an e¤ect on that classication. The
Court considered that a remuneration model may amount to an abuse, in particular when
another method exists which enables the use of those works and the audience to be identied
and quantied more precisely and that method is capable of achieving the same legitimate
aim [. . . ] without however leading to a disproportionate increase in the costs incurred for
the management of the contracts and the supervision of the use of musical works protected
by copyright.58 Should Googles plainti¤s prove that the remuneration method employed
by Google in the bidding process is articially inated and that another neutral and cost
e¤ective method exists, they might have a workable case under Article 102 (a) TFEU.
Price discrimination among di¤erent advertisers or Internet web-sites might also consti-
tute an additional exploitative strategy: there should be in this case evidence of a competitive
disadvantage under Article 102 (c). This is easier to prove the case law requires only that
the behavior tends to distort competition, and there is no need to adduce evidence of an
actual quantiable deterioration in the competitive position of the business partners taken
individually.59 The reduction of competition might refer to the foreclosure of talented pro-
grammers by Google, everything that can put Googles rivals (vertical search engines and
other websites) in competitive disadvantage. One could also add the existence of consumer
harm from unwelcoming advertising, but this is hard to prove as an antitrust violation.
In the remainder of the paper for the purpose of building the formal model and deriving
policy implications we will concentrate on the consequences of the strategies identied in this
section that may lead to monopolization or abuse of dominant position through excessive
pricing and deterioration of the quality of search results. The theoretical model of section 4
below analyzes the impact of monopolization of the search engine market on advertisers in
the form of excessive pricing and on investments in improvements of quality of search results
by search engines themselves. We also show that the trend towards concentration in this
market may lead to consumer harm. First, a monopolist has incentives to reduce the quality
of the search engine for the organic search results valued by end users. Second, the level of
innovation in the market may also be a¤ected. More generally, we show that monopoly is
58Ibid., para. 40.
59Case C-95/04 British Airways v. Commission [2007] 4 CMLR 22, para. 144-145.
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sub-optimal both in terms of harm to advertisers in the form of excessive prices, harm to
users in the form of reduction in quality of search results, as well as harm to the society in
the form of lower innovation rates in the industry.
4 The Model of Monopolistic Internet Search Engine
4.1 Structure of the Search Engine Market
In order to model the internet search market we rst have to understand the structure of
this market. As we discussed above, the search engine market has certain distinctive features
related to structure, costs and pricing, which should be taken into account when building a
theoretical model.
Firstly, the structure of the search engine market has a multi-sided aspect in which the
search engine acts as a platform intermediating between content providers, users/searchers,
and advertisers. This feature of the search engine market calls for applications of two-sided
markets models.
Secondly, we discuss the pricing structure. Search engines do not directly charge users
for their service but supply it for free, while content providers are actually subsidized by the
search engines. Hence, in our framework we assume that search engines cannot set prices for
users (whether positive or negative) but rather are constrained to price at zero. In the formal
model we express it by setting pU = 0. In addition, we do not model explicitly the content
providersside of the market. But rather implicitly incorporate them into the search engine
technology through additional cost component. Next, similar to Pollock (2010) we assume
that the pool of material made available by content providers is available to all search engines
and, as such, content providers can be ignored as (strategic) agents leaving us to focus solely
on the other three types (users, advertisers, and platform (or search engine) itself).
Next, we turn to the pricing structure on the advertisersside of the market. Our approach
to modeling advertisersside of the market is simplied compared to Edelman et al (2007),
Varian (2007), Ellison and Ellison (2004), Chen and He (2006), Athey and Ellison (2011),
or White (2008). Since the primary aim of our project is to concentrate on the impact
of network e¤ects and quality improving innovation e¤orts, we believe the advertisersside
of the market can be modeled using the general approach in Armstrong (2006). This will
capture an important characteristic of this market, namely that advertisers are required
to pay strictly positive prices for search engine services. In the formal model the price
charged to advertisers is denoted by pA > 0. Advertisers also value the quality of the search
engine. However, contrary to users the marginal cost of serving one additional advertiser
is strictly positive. In the formal model we denote it by fA > 0. This reects the cost of,
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for example, signing the contract, assisting, or arranging the auction procedures for each
particular advertiser.
Finally, the important feature of the search engine market relates to technology and costs.
In particular, search engines are R&D intensive and the market generally displays high levels
of innovation. This innovation usually occurs within a particular software environment
that determines the type of engineers (and specic skills) required. These specic skills
may be scarce and very costly. In addition, considerable investment e¤orts are necessary
for supporting, monitoring, and sponsoring content providers. This implies that running
a search engine service is highly capital intensive. We will denote these investments (or
innovation e¤orts) as k quality improving innovation e¤orts. Both of these types of cost,
whether related to R&D and acquiring young talented engineers, or the development and
maintenance of service infrastructure and content, will be modeled as an increasing function
of quality improving innovation e¤orts F (k), with F 0(k) > 0 for all k 2 [0;1).60 At the
same time the marginal cost of serving one additional user is very low and we will set it to
zero, i.e. fU = 0.
4.2 Two-sided Search Engine Market Model
Having established the evidence for the high degree of concentration and the threat of dom-
inant position of Google in the internet search engine market, we present here the analysis
for a monopoly platform in order to focus on the possible threat of abuse of dominant po-
sition by Google in the internet search engine market.61 For the purpose of modelling a
search engine market we adapt a modication of Armstrong (2006) two-sided market model.
In particular, we consider here the model of a two-sided market, where only one side pays
(advertisers). Advertisers value the presence of consumers (users), while the externality on
consumersside maybe positive, null, or negative. The platform can also raise the utility of
both sides by investing k in quality improvements.
Suppose there are two groups of agents, denoted U (users) and A (advertisers). A member
of one group cares about the number of the members of the other group who use the platform.
Suppose the utility of an agent is determined in the following way: if the platform attracts
nU and nA members of the two groups, the utilities of a group-U agent and a group-A agent
60We do not restrict this cost function to be convex in order to capture the S-shaped returns to scale.
As motivated by Etro (2011b), the combination of network e¤ects and learning by doing induces S-shaped
returns to scale in the search engine market. Hence, the rst stage cost function can be approximated by
the concave increasing function, while the second stage cost function can be approximated by the convex
increasing function.
61In the more technical companion paper Motchenkova et al. (2012) we extend the model to an asymmetric
oligopoly setting, which allows to also analyze the interplay between market dominance, network e¤ects, and
incentives to innovate in the search engine market.
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are respectively
uU(k; pU ; nA) = UnA + k   pU and uA(k; pA; nU) = AnU + k   pA; (1)
where pU and pA are the platforms prices to the two groups. Recall that pU = 0, since users
are served for free.62 While pA is assumed to be positive.63 The parameter U measures the
benet a group-U agent (user) enjoys from interacting with each group-A agent (advertiser).
We do not restrict this benet U to be either positive or negative (i.e. we allow for two
possible situations: users appreciate additional advertising or they only care about content
and annoyed by the presence of additional advertising among the search result). We will
analyze the implications of both cases when discuss the results of the model. Next, A
measures the benet a group-A agent (advertiser) obtains from each group-U agent (user).
It is reasonable to assume that A > 0; i.e. the benet for advertiser from interacting
with one additional user on the other side of the market is always positive. The variable k
denotes the quality improving innovation e¤orts. Expression (1) describes how utilities are
determined as a function of the numbers of agents who participate (nj , j = A;U), network
externalities (j, j = A;U), prices charged by the platform (pj, j = A;U), and the amount
of quality improving innovation investments incurred by the search engine (k).64 Similar to
Armstrong (2006) to close the demand model, we specify the numbers of participants as a
function of the utilities. If the utilities o¤ered to the two groups are uU and uA, then the
numbers of each group who join the platform will be determined as follows
nU = U(uU) and nA = A(uA)
Here U() and A() represent increasing functions of utilities, with 0j() > 0 and 00j ()  0
for j = A;U .65
62Similar assumption is employed in e.g. Jeon, Jullien, and Klimenko (2011).
63Again, similar to Jeon, Jullien, and Klimenko (2011), we assume that each platform charges a positive
subscription fee to advertisers. Actually, Googles advertising fee is per click, which can be incorporated in
our model as a multiplicative function of the number of users niU and the quality of the matching technology
ki (e.g. f ckiniU  f ckix), which enters the prot function of each platform with the positive sign. However,
this would make it impossible to conduct analysis with closed form solutions in the current framework.
Thats why we postpone this extension to future research.
64We assume here that quality improving e¤orts (investments) map one-to-one to realized quality of the
search engine, which is valued by users and advertisers. In general, the results of the model would go through
for any increasing mapping from k to quality.
65This property of the  function can be interpreted as follows. Firstly, the utility of each agent depends
on the number of the agents on the other side of the platform. Then convex  function can be interpreted
as participation rates grow slowly when less agents join platform on the other side, since there is little value
(especially for advertisers) in using platform if they cannot reach users. Similar e¤ect was observed in Goyal
and Kearns (2012) for online social networking services.
Under opposite assumption (00(u) < 0) the results of Proposition 3 still can hold, but only under some
specic parameter values. Under assumption 00(u) < 0, the results are generally ambiguous.
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On the cost side, the monopoly platform incurs a per-agent cost fA for group A (ad-
vertisers) and costs of quality improving capital investments F (k), with F 0(k) > 0 for all
k 2 [0;1).66 A per-agent cost fU for group U (users) is assumed to be zero, fU = 0.
Therefore, the monopolistic search engines prot is given by
(k; pA) = nA(pA   fA)  F (k):
If we consider the platform to be o¤ering utilities uU and uA rather than price pA and quality
k; then the implicit quality o¤ered for users k = uU  UnA and the implicit price for group
A (advertisers) is pA = AnU + k   uA = AnU + uU   UnA   uA. Therefore, expressed in
terms of utilities, the platforms prot is given by
(uU ; uA) = A(uA)[AU(uU) + uU   UA(uA)  uA   fA]  F (uU   UA(uA)): (2)
Next, the aggregate consumer surplus of group U is denoted as vU(uU) and the aggregate
consumer surplus of group A is denoted as vA(uA). Following Armstrong (2006), we employ
that vj() satises the envelope condition v0j(uj)  j(uj); j = A;U . Then welfare, which is
measured by the unweighted sum of prot and consumer surplus, is given by
w(uU ; uA) = (uU ; uA) + vU(uU) + vA(uA): (3)
4.3 Results and Policy Implications
In this section we, rst, present the results of the analysis of the welfare-maximizing outcome.
That is we derive socially optimal price and the socially optimal level of quality improving
investments. Next, we compare this result to the outcome derived in case the search engine
market is monopolized by a single rm. The two contrasting results are given in propositions
1 and 2, respectively.
Proposition 1 The socially optimal price (pA) and the level of quality improving innovation
e¤orts (k) satisfy
F 0(k) = (A
0
U(u

U) + 1)n

A + n

U (4)
pA = fA   UnU   UA0U(uU)nA (5)
66Having F (k) an increasing function of k seems to be consistent with S-shaped returns to scale in the
search engine market discussed in Etro (2011b). However, the approach to model the impact of quality
improving e¤orts, ki and F (ki); can be improved. For example, the cost of quality improving e¤orts can be
increasing not only with ki but also with niU , since it might be more di¢ cult to manage the engine when
more queries are running. Then ki and niU should enter additively the cost function. Again, for the purpose
of tractability of the current model we leave this extension to future research.
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Proof. Taking the FOC of expression (3) wrt uU and substituting v0j(uj)  j(uj) and
nj = j(uj) for j = U;A we obtain
@w(uU ; uA)
@uU
= AnA
0
U(uU) + nA + nU   F 0() = 0
) F 0(k) = (A0U(uU) + 1)nA + nU
Taking the FOC of expression (3) wrt uA and substituting v0j(uj)  j(uj) and nj = j(uj)
for i = U;A we obtain the following expression. Recall also that 0A() > 0 and F 0() =
(A
0
U(uU) + 1)nA + nU :
@w(uU ; uA)
@uA
= 0A(uA) [pA   UnA   fA + UF 0()]  nA + nA = 0
) pA = fA + UnA   UF 0()
) pA = fA   U [F 0()  nA]
) pA = fA   U [(A0U(uU)nA + nA + nU   nA]
Hence, at the optimum pA = fA   UnU   UA0U(uU)nA
This concludes the proof of proposition 1.
Analysis of expression (5) shows that the optimal price o¤ered to advertisers equals the
cost of supplying service (fA) adjusted downward (or upwards) by the external benet (or
disutility) that an extra group-A agent (advertiser) brings to the group-U agents (users) on
the platform. (There are nU users on the platform, and each one benets by U when an
extra advertiser joins, provided that U > 0.) In particular, prices should be below cost if
U > 0 or they can be higher than cost (fA) if U < 0: Recall A > 0; 
0
U(uU) > 0; and
nA > 0: Expression (5) shows some similarity with the result obtained in Armstrong (2006)
except of an additional term  UA0U(uU)nA, which would adjust the price o¤ered by the
platform to advertisers even further down in case U > 0 (i.e. when additional advertising is
appreciated by users): Or wise versa, the presence of this additional term would increase the
price charged to advertisers above the one specied in Armstrong (2006) when U < 0 (i.e.
users do not care about advertising at all and are only interested in the content). In case
U > 0; this additional term can be interpreted as further downward adjustment in price
charged to advertisers due to positive quality improvement spillover or due to improving the
t between customers and advertisers.
Next, we move to the discussion of the results and policy implications in the situation
when the search engine market is monopolized by a single rm. In the next proposition we
derive the prot-maximizing price and the level of quality improving investments chosen by
the monopolist.
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Proposition 2 The prot-maximizing price (pmA ) and the level of quality improving invest-
ments (km) chosen in the monopolized search engine market satisfy
F 0(km) = (A
0
U(u
m
U ) + 1)n
m
A (6)
pmA = fA   UA0U(umU )nmA +
A(u
m
A )
0A(u
m
A )
(7)
Proof. Taking the FOC of expression (2) wrt uU and substituting nj = j(uj) for
j = U;A we obtain
@(uU ; uA)
@uU
= AnA
0
U(uU) + nA   F 0() = 0
) F 0(km) = (A0U(umU ) + 1)nmA
Taking the FOC of expression (2) wrt uA and substituting nj = j(uj) for j = U;A we obtain
the following expression. Recall also that in case of monopoly optimal k is characterized by
F 0() = (A0U(uU) + 1)nA:
@(uU ; uA)
@uA
= 0A(uA) [pA   UnA   fA + UF 0()]  nA = 0
) pA = fA + UnA   UF 0() + nA
0A(uA)
) pA = fA   U [F 0()  nA] + A(uA)
0A(uA)
) pA = fA   U [(A0U(uU)nA + nA   nA] +
A(uA)
0A(uA)
Hence, at the optimum pmA = fA   UA0U(umU )nmA +
A(u
m
A )
0A(u
m
A )
This concludes the proof of proposition 2.
Hence, we can conclude that the prot-maximizing price o¤ered to advertisers is equal
to the cost of providing service (fA), adjusted downward by (UA
0
U(uU)nA) the external
benet to both users and advertisers and quality improving e¤orts by the platform, and
adjusted upward by a factor related to the elasticity of the groups participation

A(uA)
0A(uA)

.
The di¤erence with the results obtained in Armstrong (2006) is hiding in the second term
(UA
0
U(uU)nA). Armstrong (2006) nds it equal to UnU , i.e. only external benet to
users would have inuenced the price charged to advertisers in his setting. This di¤erence
again can be attributed to the presence of additional quality improvement spillover that
improves the t between customers and advertisers and also between search results and
customers queries.
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Finally, comparison of the results of Propositions 1 and 2 implies the following proposi-
tion.
Proposition 3 Monopolization of the search engine market leads to under-investment in
improvements of the quality of the search engine compared to social optimum. In addition,
it leads to increase in prices charged to advertisers above socially optimal level when U  0:
Proof. The proof of this proposition contains three steps:
1. First, for the existence of interior maximum the prot function (uU ; uA) in expression
(2) is assumed to be strictly concave. In this case the social welfare function w(uU ; uA) in
(3) represents a transformation of this concave prot function in (2) by adding consumer
surpluses of two groups vU(uU) and vA(uA); users and advertisers, respectively. vU(uU) and
vA(uA) are assumed to be increasing and concave functions as well. If these (rather common)
conditions on the objective functions are satised, then uU , which results from unconstrained
optimization of (3) with respect to uU and uA, is strictly greater than umU , which results from
unconstrained optimization of (2) with respect to uU and uA. Hence, we have that uU > u
m
U .
The same holds for uA > u
m
A . This implies that (by monotonicity of   functions, recall (:)
functions are assumed to be strictly increasing) nA > n
m
A and n

U > n
m
U as well.
2. Next, comparison of (4) and (6), taking into account that F 0(k) > 0; uU > u
m
U ;
nA > n
m
A ; and 
00
U()  0; implies that km < k:
3. Finally, comparison of (5) and (7), taking into account that 0A() > 0; uU > umU ;
nA > n
m
A ; and 
00
U()  0; implies that
pmA > p

A when U  0
pmA < p

A when U < 0 and jUnU j > A(uA)0A(uA) :
This concludes the proof of proposition 3.
This proposition shows that monopolization of the search engine market unambiguously
results in under-investment in quality improvements by the search engine platform compared
to social optimum. The e¤ect on prices charged to advertises seems ambiguous. When the
presence of advertisers on the search engine is welcomed by users (i.e. U  0), monopolistic
search engine charges advertisers more compared to social optimum. This is an indication
of exploitative abuse of dominant position through excessive pricing.67 To summarize the
analysis in this section we conclude that the monopoly platform choice of k (quality improving
capital investments) is sub-optimal. The result is robust to any choice of functional forms.
It is also quite intuitive. The main driver of the result is that there is no price for consumers
67It should also be mentioned that when presence of advertisers on the search engine is not welcomed by
the users (i.e. U < 0), monopolistic search engine charges advertisers less compared to social optimum.
This harms consumers even more since it causes further increase of unwelcome advertising.
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(on the usersside of the market). As a consequence, when choosing k the platform only
cares about the indirect impact on the advertising revenue and not about the direct impact
on the consumerswillingness to pay. This causes under-investment in quality improvements
by the monopolist compared to the socially optimal value, which also takes into account
usersutility.
5 Conclusions and Policy Proposal
The formal analysis in section 4 concludes that monopolization of the search engine market
by a single rm (such as Google) would lead to reduction of quality of search results com-
pared to the social optimum. In addition, it generally leads to an increase in prices charged
to advertisers above socially optimal level. We argue that the evidence on increasing concen-
tration, the current characteristics of the search engine market, and the theoretical results
of the paper suggest that some form of intervention is needed in order to avoid possible abu-
sive conduct by the dominant search engine that may lead to monopolization of this market
(recall that we identied restricting multihoming and leveraging as abuses leading to mo-
nopolization). Hence, antitrust intervention is needed in order to prevent the deterioration
in quality and relevance of search results.
The issue of maintaining proper quality and relevance of search results in practice is
closely connected to maintaining proper quality of search algorithms, prevention of search
bias and prevention of manipulation of rankings of organic search results, which by themselves
maybe considered abusive. This implies that, since often the incentives to maintain higher
quality for dominant rm may be reduced, the likelihood of the above mentioned abusive
manipulation of rankings and search algorithms is higher when the search engine market is
dominated or monopolized by a single rm. More symmetric distribution of power would
lead to a better outcome in terms of quality.68 In the current situation, regulators should be
empowered to have more control over quality of search results or at least develop e¤ective
instruments that would provide proper incentives for dominant rm to comply with quality
standards.
Some authors have argued that principles of search neutralityshould apply to Google,69
or any other dominant rm in online search, as part of a more general attempt to reect
on the self-regulation of online intermediariesand to advance alternative regulatory options
68Similar to Argenton and Prüfer (2012), the desired reduction in the asymmetry in the size of network
e¤ects can be achieved through the remedy to require search engines to share their data bases and data on
previous searches. This would reduce the degree of product di¤erentiation and level the playing eld in the
quality dimension. These issues will be elaborated further in a more technical companion paper Motchenkova
et al. (2012).
69Oren Bracha & Frank Pasquale, 2007
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(including competition law).70 In the EU context, such calls may have a stronger appeal, in
view of the special responsibility of dominant rms to protect the competitive process under
EU competition law71 and the very active stance the European Commission has taken in
the past to ensure openness of access (and interoperability) in major technological platforms
for undertakings active in related and vertically situated markets.72 The concept of search
neutrality is quite general in scope, but it seems that it can be interpreted as requiring a
search engine to ensure that it does not explicitly favour one website/company over another,
for reasons other than those linked to the quality score of the specic website/or consumer
preferences, and that the algorithms designed to discriminate on the basis of assigning value
to the production of search results are set and applied transparently and objectively. Search
neutrality should be compared to a process-oriented, rather than an outcome-oriented, norm,
as it requires from the dominant undertaking to establish the adequate procedures for keeping
the process exempt from any bias. Biasmay have di¤erent meanings: it can relate to
prejudice, inclination, partiality or tendency a¤ecting judgment in the sense that no equal
chance is o¤ered to another idea or, in our example, website. Yet, not all forms of bias may
form the object of an antitrust law action. Google or any dominant undertaking should be
free to develop an intellectual, artistic or ideological bias, as this forms integral part of
their right to form an editorial judgment on the content displayed in their search engine,
which is protected by their freedom of expression, under the rst amendment of the US
Constitution and the European Convention of Human Rights. After all, the ranking of a
website is an opinion expressed about the likely relevance of this information (website) to a
query. This intellectual bias should be distinguished from material bias, which is related to
the economic interest of the dominant search engine to favour its own products in related or
auxiliary relevant markets, such as the activity of specialized search. In this context, the bias
is not protected by the freedom of expression, as its purpose is to distort competition and to
maintain or extend the market power or dominant position of the search engine. The theory
of harm is an essential step in linking the alleged material bias (facts) with the prohibition of
an abuse of a dominant position (law) and hence inherently limits the scope of the antitrust
remedy, according to the proportionality principle. Only by closely designing the remedy in
response to the underlying theory of harm it is possible to full the strict conditions of the
proportionality test. The remedy should thus relate to the material bias only and should
aim to remove any incentives the dominant rm has not to apply the relevant procedures for
ensuring that all websites benet from an equal chance to gure in the rst rankings of its
70Berin Szoka & Adam Marcus (eds.), 2010, chapters 6 & 7.
71Case C-395/96 P Compagnie Maritime Belge [2000] ECR I-1365, para. 37 ; Case C-52/09, Konkur-
rensverket v. TeliaSonera Sverige AB [February 17, 2011], not yet published, para. 23;
72Economides & Lianos, 2010; Lianos, 2012.
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search engine.
There are di¤erent options that may be followed. The rst is to remove the structural
conditions for the material bias to exist at the rst place by divesting the general search
engine function from specialized search tools, thus splitting Google into a general search
company and a specialized search company, and thus removing any economic interest for the
dominant search engine to favour one or another website. Divestiture is of course a drastic
remedy, which should be the last resort, according to Article 7 of Regulation 1/2003, in
view also of the di¢ culty to administer it while respecting the business model of each of the
separated parts of Google, and the chilling innovation e¤ects it might have.73 It has been
argued that the integrated Universal search, which was introduced by Google in 2007, was
a major innovation, quickly followed by Googles competitors in the online search market
(Marvin Ammori & Luke Pelican, 2012).
The second option would be to choose an assisted preemptive transparency remedy, linked
to the implementation of information remedies aimed to increase market transparency for
consumers with new disclosure rules indicating that Googles search results may be biased
and thus be of lower quality than the counterfactual paradigm of a materially unbiased search
engine. These disclosure rules will raise the cost for Google of manually adjusting the results
of the algorithm with the aim to favour a proprietary website (which is di¢ cult to monitor
on a case by case basis), and thus create incentives for Google to adhere and apply e¤ectively
search neutrality principles. One of the advantages of this remedy is that it moves the cost
of implementation to Google, while providing the latter some discretion to choose the most
adequate tools to implement search neutrality. The remedy is based on the assumption that
the quality of search results is di¢ cult to observe, hence consumers would have no means on
their own to know when the quality is low and thus to switch to competing search engines.
Nothing also guarantees that competing search engines would not adopt similar policies, thus
leading to an overall decrease of the quality of search and thus consumer welfare.74 The fact
that no equivalent remedy may be adopted against competing search engines is irrelevant,
in view of the special responsibility of dominant undertakings in EU competition law.
The remedy may also provide incentives for other search engines to di¤erentiate themselves
through an optional positive disclosure by indicating that they are not vertically integrated
73For similar comments on the e¤ects of the proposed structural remedy against Microsoft in the Internet
Explorer browser tying case, see Economides & Lianos, 2010.
74Our assumption is that search as any other service may be classied as good or bad quality, relevance
to the consumer but also impartiality of the search opinion provided being among the quality criteria. One
would have no hesitation to characterize a restaurant guide which ranks restaurants not on the criterion
of their service or the culinary experience provided to the consumer, as one would have expected from a
restaurant guide, but focusing on some form of material bias (favouring restaurants owned by the editor of
the restaurant guide) as being a bad quality restaurant guide. The same applies here.
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or that they have established internal procedures and/or Chinese walls between their general
search and specialized search functions. Of course, a cease and desist order coupled with a
penalty-based deterrence through the imposition of a ne might also provide incentives to
the dominant search engine to develop internal procedures to promote the impartiality of its
results.
A further possibility will be to assist the consumer by providing a reliable expert advice on
the impartiality of the dominant search engine. This could be done by a technical committee
or monitoring trustee recruited for this purpose or a consumer watchdog (from the voluntary
sector appointed in the context of a cy press remedy), which would have as its task to publish
periodically a report examining the commitment of the dominant search engine to impartial
search results, after a careful empirical analysis of an array of search results across di¤erent
categories. The periodic publication of the report will provide incentives to the dominant
search engine to improve its score. One could however object to this remedy that consumers
may not necessarily adjust their behavior in the marketplace to the ndings of the report of
this committee or consumer watchdog and thus stick with a search engine that demonstrably
exercises material bias. In this case, the choice is either to consider that impartial and
unbiased search is not among the preferences of the consumers, or at least those that are
important enough to inuence their behavior on the market, in which case this is the end of
the antitrust story, or to advance a more libertarian paternalistic argument, that consumers
need to be protected from their own failing to appreciate the importance of the impartiality
of search, and thus move to a more regulatory intensive remedial option.
Inter-rm sharing of information about search results (data portability) may also enable
the competitors of the dominant search engine to provide search opinions of at least a similar
degree of relevance to the consumersquestions and thus serve as the default quality standard
for search results. It would thus be possible to compare the search results of various search
engines, having a similar amount of data, in order to nd if the dominant search engine diverts
considerably from the predominant practice of the other search engines, in which case one
might assume that this diversion can be explained by material bias. Data portability would
thus be an adequate remedy, but also would contribute to the nding of material bias by
the technical committee/monitoring trustee or the consumer watchdog, should this option
be nally pursued.
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